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INTRODUCTION
There is no internationally agreed-to definition or clear
demarcation of what constitutes national security interests and what
constitutes purely economic competitiveness concerns. Although
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there has always existed some tension between the protection of
national security interests and the promotion of global trade,
countries have tended to maintain a respectful distance between the
two principles—generally utilizing security-related authorities for
issues directly related to military or defense interests, while using
trade law authorities to take actions that clearly impact economic
well-being.2 Indeed, the only situation where the two principles
intersected was when security measures were recognized as a
narrow exception to international trade and investment treaty
obligations.3 And even then, until very recently, this exception was
rarely relied upon.4
Recently, many government actions have challenged the
boundary between security and economic interests, as countries
have adopted increasingly broad definitions of national security, and
begun utilizing security-related authorities to address what has
always been recognized as purely trade or economic
competitiveness issues.
Here in the United States, certain actions that were taken by
former President Donald J. Trump during his tenure present key
examples of how the concept of “national security” has expanded
under his “America First” doctrine to include ensuring that the U.S.
maintains its economic and trade pole positions in all industries—
not just in high tech, but also in manufacturing industries, laborintensive industries, and energy-intensive industries. 5
This
necessarily resulted in repurposing traditional, narrowly tailored
national security authority to maintain the economic well-being of
business enterprises. For example, in recommending the imposition
of trade restrictions against global imports of steel and aluminum
under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which was
originally intended only to “safeguard[] national security,” the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
confirmed that “national security” under Section 232 is not limited
to “national defense,” but can be interpreted much more broadly to
2

J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129
YALE L. J. 1020 (2019).
3
Peter Van den Bossche & Sarah Akpofure, The Use and Abuse of the National
Security Exception Under Article XXI(B)(III) of the GATT 1994, at 2–3 (World Trade
Institute, WTI Working Paper No. 03/2020, 2020).
4
Id.
5
Heath, supra note 2, at 1022–5.
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“include the general security and welfare of certain U.S. industries,
beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements.” 6
The recent expansion of national security interests to
encompass economic well-being has coincided with China’s rise in
the global power standing, which several governments (including
the U.S. government) have viewed with serious concern. 7 In the
course of expanding the scope of national security, the Trump
Administration depicted the rise of China as not only an economic
threat, but also as an existential threat to the United States. 8 Indeed,
it often appeared that the Trump Administration went as far as to
equate economic threats with existential threats.
This rationale was employed to justify a cascade of trade
actions promulgated as “national security”-based and other
defensive measures. These included imposing tariffs on hundreds
of billions of dollars of products from China, imposing extensive
new sanctions on Chinese companies, restricting Chinese companies
from buying American technology, and barring investments in
Chinese firms with military ties.9
By adopting an excessively broad definition of national
security that encompasses the maintenance of economic advantages,
these actions and policies are often ill-tailored to address the actual
economic factors giving rise to the problem. They also often fail to
6
U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY: AN
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962,
AS AMENDED 1–5 (Jan. 11, 2018), bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/steel/2224-the-effectof-imports-of-steel-on-the-national-security-with-redactions-20180111/file
[https://perma.cc/47U3-P6L7] [hereinafter “Steel Section 232 Report”].
7
Ana Nicolaci da Costa, How the world is grappling with China’s rising power,
BBC NEWS
(Oct.
26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45948692
[https://perma.cc/655F-54NF].
8
Ana Swanson, A New Red Scare is Reshaping Washington, N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/us/politics/china-red-scare-washington.html
[https://perma.cc/9TCR-UBMR]; Matthew Lee, Pompeo Brings Anti-China Roadshow to
Indian
Ocean
Islands,
abc
NEWS
(Oct.
28,
2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/pompeo-brings-anti-china-roadshowindian-ocean-islands-73871011 [https://perma.cc/3MG8-GQEP].
9
See e.g., Exec. Order No. 14,032, 86 Fed. Reg. 30,145 (June 7, 2021); Exec. Order
No. 13,959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73,185 (Nov. 17, 2020); President Trump Announces Strong
Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong
[https://perma.cc/FN45-C6DS] (detailing the Trump administration’s changes in Chinese
trade policy).
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acknowledge China as a legitimate, rising economic competitor.
Indeed, these measures do not really address the “national security”
threats they purport to target (as the threat is often not even securitybased), nor do they effectively increase the competitiveness of the
United States vis-à-vis China, as they do nothing to help U.S.
companies compete fairly. Instead, they unlevel the playing field in
favor of the United States so that fair competition cannot occur at
all. Ironically, in some circumstances, these measures actually end
up hurting U.S. businesses and U.S. competitive interests by
limiting sourcing options, raising costs, forcing factories to relocate
elsewhere, and giving advantages to companies from other countries
vis-à-vis China.
To be clear, China’s policies sometimes do raise legitimate
national security and defense concerns. National security-based
authorities such as Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) are
properly suited to address such concerns. However, these national
security threats should not be confused—either intentionally or
unintentionally—with the economic threats posed by China’s
increased competitiveness and the general rise in global trading
power. Measures that are based on security concerns have
traditionally focused on defending against incoming defensive
harm, rather than on building economic resilience in the face of
heightened global competition. In contrast, dealing with the
economic rise of China—including any economic advantage that
China has achieved through unfair trade actions and industrial
policies—requires the United States to hold China accountable to its
international trade treaty obligations, while also continuing to
strengthen the competitiveness of its own industries through
legitimate government incentives and policies.
Addressing
economic concerns through national security measures only
temporarily masks the core issues that need to be addressed,
depriving U.S. industries of evolving in a manner that will allow
them to grow and maintain a competitive advantage over China (and
other global competitors) beyond the narrow national security
concerns posed by another country’s economic rise in stature.
Section I of this article explores the definition and scope of
“national security,” discussing its evolution and treatment in
international economic law. Section II discusses national security in
the context of U.S.-China trade relations, providing historical
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context and exploring two specific types of U.S. national security
measures that have been used regularly in recent years to address
perceived—and sometimes purely economic—threats from China:
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and export controls.
Section III explores the adverse implications of conflating national
security interests with economic competitiveness concerns in U.S.
trade policy concerning China.

I.

WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY

This Section provides historical context regarding the
evolution of the U.S. concept of “national security” from narrow
and defense-focused to a broad and all-encompassing reading. We
then discuss national security specifically in the context of
international economic law, exploring the tension between national
security and international trade, and how international instruments
have sought to reconcile this tension.
A.

Historical Context

Prior to World War II, the concept of “national interest”—
not “national security”—was the primary standard and point of
reference for U.S. foreign policy.10 However, after the attack on
Pearl Harbor in 1941, national security replaced national interest as
the main defensive, right-of-state in U.S. foreign policy,11 a shift
that was codified in the National Security Act of 1947. 12 It was not
until after 1945 that a distinctive body of literature exploring the

10
Douglas Stuart, The National Security Act of 1947, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Oct.
25,
2012),
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0102.xml [https://perma.cc/QB5X-QAFS] (citing
CHARLES A. BEARD, THE IDEA OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 524 (1934)).
11
Id. (citing GORDON W. PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
PEARL HARBOR (1991)).
12
Id. (citing Melvyn P. Leffler, The American Conception of National Security and
the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48, 89 Am. Hist. Rev. 346, 381 (1984); ARNOLD
WOLFERS, National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, in DISCORD AND COLLABORATION:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 147–66 (1962); DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE:
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (1977)).
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concept of “security” emerged, although its definition has been
evolving continuously since. 13
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the dominant
concept of “national security” focused on physical defense, military
power, and political security.14 This perspective is attributable to
the prevalence of military conflict, proliferation of political and
military alliances, and raging arms races between ideologically
opposed superpowers that dominated foreign policy literature and
discourse at the time.15 Still today, Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“national security” consistent with this traditional view: “[t]he
safety of a country and its governmental secrets, together with the
strength and integrity of its military, seen as being necessary to the
protection of its citizens.”16
However, in the post-Cold War era, the information,
technology, and communication revolutions, together with the
reduction in imminent military threats and an increase in nontraditional security threats, fueled the evolution of a broader, less
defined landscape of “national security.”17 Issues such as domestic
economic prosperity and the promotion of democratic values began
to feature more prominently in U.S. national security strategy and
rhetoric.18 This broadening scope of “national security” was rooted
in part in seeds planted decades earlier in the National Security Act
of 1947.19 That is, in addition to its primary contributions of
significantly restructuring the U.S. government’s foreign policy and

13

LUCIA RETTER ET AL., RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY: ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY POLICY IN THE
NETHERLANDS
16
(2020),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4200/RR4287/RAND_R
R4287.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8MQ-5NQM].
14
Kim R. Holmes, What Is National Security?, The Heritage Found. (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-essays/2015-essays/what-national-security
[https://perma.cc/X5PA-EB4N].
15
Michel Gueldry et al., Introduction: Yesterday’s security debates, today’s realities,
in UNDERSTANDING NEW SECURITY THREATS (2019).
16
Bryan A. Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
17
David Jablonsky et al., U.S. National Security: Beyond the Cold War, at 18–19,
STRATEGIC STUD. INST., US ARMY WAR COLL.
(July
26,
1997),
https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1620.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA8P-6BWE].
18
Id. at 22–23.
19
National Security Act of 1947, 80 Pub. L. 253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended
through 116 Pub. L. 283 in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); 50 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3240
(1947).
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military establishments,20 the National Security Act of 1947
reflected the overarching:
“[I]ntent of Congress to provide a comprehensive
program for the future security of the United States,
to provide for the establishment of integrated policies
and procedures for the departments, agencies, and
functions of the Government relating to the national
security.”21
Notably missing from the text of the legislation, however,
was any definition of what constitutes “national security,” thereby
leaving the term open to interpretation at a time when a broader
conception of national defense was being introduced into U.S.
government and public discourse.22
In the 1990s, the concept of security evolved to embrace a
more human-centric focus, influenced by the continued decline in
military conflict and a rise in globalization and interdependence
between nation-states.23
The United Nations Development
Programme’s (UNDP) influential 1994 Human Development Report
introduced a formal framework for “human security,” arguing that:
“The concept of security has for too long been
interpreted too narrowly: as security of territory from
external aggression, or as protection of national

20
Clark A. Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. 47 (Mar. 2004), csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph1_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DJ7S-6R4Z]; National Security Act of 1947, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act
[https://perma.cc/2Q3D-SA82].
21
National Security Act of 1947, supra note 5, at § 2.
22
JOSEPH J. ROMM, DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY: THE NONMILITARY ASPECTS, at 2–
3 (1993) (“Some would trace the modern etymology of [“national security”] to an August
1945 Senate hearing: ‘Our national security can only be assured on a very broad and
comprehensive front,’ Navy secretary James Forrestal told the Senate. ‘I am using the word
‘security’ here consistently and continuously rather than ‘defense.’’ Replied Sen. Edwin
Johnson, ‘I like your words ‘national security.’”) (internal citations omitted).
23
RETTER, supra note 13, at 18–19, 21.
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interests in foreign policy or as global security from
the threat of nuclear holocaust.”24
According to the UNDP, human security has two
components—freedom from fear and freedom from want—and is
therefore not only concerned “with weapons,” but also with “human
life and dignity.”25 The UNDP went on to outline seven main
categories that form “human security”: economic security, food
security, health security, environmental security, personal security,
community security, and political security.26
Today, “national security” is arguably still used in the
narrow and traditional, defense-focused sense in more established
historical literature and policy, but the broader human-centric
concept does exist in other documents. It is rarely explicitly defined
in any given legal authority, however. As will be discussed in the
next section, in the context of international trade law, and similar to
the National Security Act of 1947, terms such as “security” or
“national security” are often not defined or are defined so broadly
that they render untethered any legal mechanism that may be
promulgated in their name. When the concept of “national security”
is not clearly defined or the “national security” threat at issue is not
precisely articulated, trade measures that would not otherwise be
covered under the narrow, traditional definition of “national
security” could be exploited and used to address not only broader
human security issues but even purely competitive and economic
issues for which those trade measures were neither designed nor
appropriately tailored.
B.

National Security in International Economic Law

The tension between national security and international trade
law stems from the potentially conflicting interests that the two
principles seek to protect. For example, under the United Nations
framework, which presents one of the major legal foundations of
24
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994 22,
(1994),
http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L6T8-CZNZ].
25
Id. at 22, 24.
26
Id. at 24–25.
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national security, the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation of States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, promotes the
principle that it is the duty of States to not intervene in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any other State. 27 Under the
World Trade Organization (WTO) framework, which presents one
of the major legal foundations of international economic law, the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, states as
one of its founding principles the desire to enter into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade. 28 In other words,
while national security is based on the right of sovereign countries
to keep other countries out, international trade is premised on the
desire to invite other countries in.
Although international trade law does not include an
implicit, open-ended national security exception that applies across
all treaties,29 multilateral and bilateral agreements have recognized
the inevitable intersection between a country’s national security
interests and economic interests and have sought to define and
reconcile the relationship between the two principles. Most notably,
several WTO agreements contain explicit provisions that permit
Members to deviate from their international trade obligations under
those agreements by reason of national security interests. Article
XXI(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GATT 1994), for instance, permits a WTO Member country to take
“any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests” when certain conditions are met.30
These conditions include when such measures relate to fissionable
materials or materials from which they are derived; to traffic in
arms, ammunition and the implements of war and to traffic in other
goods and materials for the purposes of supplying a military

27

G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 2 (Oct. 24, 1970).
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
29
Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 40
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437 (2008).
30
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT]. The “Security Exceptions” of GATT Article XXI are also
contained in Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and Article 73 of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights.
28
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establishment; or are taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations.
Although the WTO agreements seek to define the
circumstances under which the security exception can be invoked,
the exception is still worded relatively broadly, permitting WTO
Members to take “any action” that they “consider[] necessary.” 31 In
particular, the use of the term “considers” implies that the standard
of whether the measure is necessary is left to the subjective
discretion (or “consideration”) of the Member implementing the
measure, although it should be noted that exceptions are nonetheless
to be interpreted narrowly as a general matter, and utilized even
more sporadically.32
In that respect, out of over five hundred cases to date, the
WTO has issued only one decision on the application of the security
exception.33 As such, there is limited guidance on the specific
contours of the security exception, especially as to which interests
would not constitute a security interest under the WTO rules.
Nonetheless, it is widely viewed that actions commonly taken by
countries based on national defense or national security concerns,
which would restrict trade in a manner inconsistent with WTO
obligations, are taken under the auspices of the national security
exceptions.
The negotiating history of the WTO security exception
seems to confirm that the negotiating countries themselves did not
have a clear consensus on how broadly or narrowly “security
interests” should be defined. For example, while negotiating the
31
GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; GATS: General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) (both
explaining that nothing in the agreement should be construed to conflict with legitimate
security interests).
32
Consultative Board, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in
the
New
Millennium,
WTO
(Jan.
17,
2005),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NCY-5FA6].
33
Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/7 (adopted Apr. 29, 2019). Although public third-party submissions indicate
that the security exception was also invoked in United Arab Emirates—Measures Relating
to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, a panel report has not been released in that dispute. See WTO Doc. WT/DS526/6
(Jan. 19, 2021).
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terms of the security exception under the International Trade
Organization (“ITO”)—the precursor to what would ultimately
become the WTO—the Netherlands raised the question of how
“essential security interests” of a Member should be defined, noting
that such an exception could be “possibly a very big loophole in the
whole [ITO] Charter.”34 The response of the United States appears
to recognize the challenges of defining “security interests” in a
manner that was not overly broad, but afforded some latitude to
each country:
We recognized that there was a great danger of having too
wide an exception and we could not put it into the Charter, simply
by saying: “by any member of measures relating to a Member’s
security interests”, because that would permit anything under the
sun. Therefore, we thought it well to draft provisions which would
take care of real security interests and, at the same time, so far as we
could, to limit the exception so as to prevent the adoption of
protection for maintaining industries under every, conceivable
circumstance . . . .[T]here must be some latitude here for security
measures. It is really a question of balance. We have got to have
some exceptions. We cannot make it too tight, because we cannot
prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. On
the other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of
security, countries will put on measures, which really have a
commercial purpose.35
The Chairman suggested that the spirit in which Members
would interpret these provisions was the only guarantee against
abuse36—essentially leaving it to future generations to grapple with
the issue once the need arose.
The reluctance of WTO Member countries to challenge
national security measures ostensibly taken under the security
exception have left this ambiguity largely unresolved. In the
absence of clear guidelines, WTO provisions that were arguably
intended to provide a narrow exception could still be deployed to
address broader human security issues or even purely competitive
issues, for which they are not appropriately tailored.
34
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Rep. of the Second Session
of the Prep. Comm., U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33, at 19 (1947).
35
Id. at 20.
36
Id. at 3.
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However, more recent developments seem to suggest that
conditionalities found in provisions such as Article XXI(b) of the
GATT 1994 do in fact provide sufficient safeguard against overly
broad usage of national security excuses to justify trade actions that
violate WTO obligations. For example, although it ultimately found
that Russia’s actions were justified under the security exception, the
panel in Russia—Traffic in Transit considered that the traditional,
military and defense-related definition of security applies in
interpreting the contours of “emergency in international relations”
under the WTO security exceptions, stating that the term would:
“[A]ppear to refer generally to a situation of armed
conflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of heightened
tension or crisis, or of general instability engulfing or
surrounding a state. Such situations give rise to
particular types of interests for the Member in
question, i.e. defense or military interests, or
maintenance of law and public order interests.” 37
The panel also considered that although “it is left, in general,
to every Member to define what it considers to be its essential
security interests,”38 the principle of good faith “requires that
Members not use the exceptions in Article XXI as a means to
circumvent their obligations under the GATT.”39 The panel cited as
a “glaring example” of such actions:
“[W]here a Member sought to release itself from the
structure of ‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements’ that constitutes the multilateral trading
system simply by re-labeling trade interests that it
had agreed to protect and promote within the system,
as ‘essential security interests,’ falling outside the
reach of that system.”40

37
38
39
40

Supra note 33 at ¶ 7.76.
Id. at ¶ 7.131.
Id. at ¶ 7.133.
Id.
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The panel’s findings imply, at the very least, that a WTO
Member cannot adopt a measure that seeks to secure its competitive
or economic interest under the guise of a “security interest.”

II.

“NATIONAL SECURITY” AND U.S.-CHINA TRADE
RELATIONS

As explained above, in the absence of clear guidance in
multilateral agreements that govern trade relations regarding the
parameters of “security interests,” countries have been mainly left
unfettered in determining their definitions of national security. In
the United States, the White House National Security Council has
stated that “[t]oday’s challenges demand a new and broader
understanding of national security—one that facilitates coordination
between domestic and foreign policy as well as among traditional
national security, economic security, health security, and
environmental security.”41 Moreover, as described in Section B
below, U.S. laws or regulations relating to “national security” do not
clearly define the circumstances under which their legal authorities
can be invoked, leaving it to the relevant agencies (or the President)
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the requirements for
invocation have been met. Under this backdrop, U.S. laws that
ostensibly protect the United States “national security” interests
have recently been invoked to address seemingly economic
competitive concerns arising from China.
A.

U.S. Policy Regarding China

China began reforming its economic policies in the late
1970s, opening up to foreign trade and investment and
implementing free-market reforms in 1979. 42 These reforms
included price and ownership incentives for farmers that allowed
them to sell a portion of their crops in the free market, and the
establishment of special economic zones to attract foreign
41

National Security Council, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
[https://perma.cc/G9BF-9QTG].
42
Bert Hofman, Reflections on 40 years of China’s reforms, in CHINA’S 40 YEARS OF
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: 1978–2018 53, 54 (2018). See also Gregory C. Chow,
Economic Reform and Growth in China, 5 ANN. ECON. 127, 132–33 (2004) (discussing
that in the late 1970s, the Chinese government began to promote foreign investment and
adopt the open-door policy).
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investments, boost exports from China, and encourage imports of
hi-tech products into China.43 Additional reforms included efforts
to decentralize economic policy sectors, and reforming ownership
structures to allow enterprises to compete more freely in an open
market.44 Since then, China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% per
year, rendering it consistently among the fastest growing economies
in the world.45 Between 1980 and 2004, U.S.-China trade increased
from $5 billion to $231 billion, and by 2006, China had surpassed
Mexico as the United States’ second largest trading partner, after
Canada.46 In 2008, China surpassed Japan to become the United
States’ largest foreign creditor, holding U.S. debt of around $600
billion.47 China is now the United States’ largest trading partner, as
the United States’ most significant source of imports and thirdlargest export market.48 Particularly in recent years, China has risen
to the status of a legitimate economic competitor and near-peer of
the United States, having already overtaken the U.S. in terms of
purchasing power parity and with projections estimating that it will
overtake U.S. Gross Domestic Product within the next decade. 49
As China’s economy has matured, the Chinese government
has announced several large-scale economic planning initiatives
such as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (hereinafter BRI) and “Made
in China 2025” (hereinafter MIC2025). The BRI, which President
Xi Jinping launched in 2013, is an ultra-ambitious expansion project
that seeks to achieve economic integration throughout Eurasia and
beyond by financing and building a network of railways, energy
pipelines, highways, streamlined border crossings, ports, and free

43

Id. Hofman, supra note 42, at 56–61; Chow, supra note 42, at 140–41.
WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE:
HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 4 (2019).
45
Overview,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(Oct.
12,
2021),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview [https://perma.cc/AS82-4XBU].
46
U.S.
Relations
with
China,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china [https://perma.cc/JBL4-CAMB].
47
Id.
48
The People’s Republic of China: U.S.-China Trade Facts, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE.,
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoplesrepublic-china [https://perma.cc/PZ6V-3FP6].
49
Naomi Xu Elegant, China’s 2020 GDP Means It Will Overtake U.S. as World’s No.
1 Economy Sooner than Expected, FORTUNE (Jan. 18, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://fortune.com/2021/01/18/chinas-2020-gdp-world-no-1-economy-us/
[https://perma.cc/GE6L-7RZ9].
44
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trade zones.50
In addition to infrastructure-building, other
components of the BRI include strengthened regional political
cooperation, unimpeded trade, financial integration (including
expanding the international use of RMB), and people-to-people
exchanges.51
Alongside the BRI, the Chinese government in 2015 also
announced MIC2025—a plan to modernize China’s manufacturing
in ten key sectors through extensive government assistance in order
to make China a major global player in these sectors. 52 Under
MIC2025, China seeks to raise domestic content of core
components and materials to 70% by 2025.53 To achieve these
objectives, China imposes tax preferences, joint ventures and
partnership requirements, government subsidies, foreign
acquisitions, technology licensing and equipment, and talent
recruitment, in an effort to promote on-shore manufacturing
capabilities in hi-tech industries.54
These initiatives by China have raised increasing concerns
that China seeks to expand its rising power and use industrial
policies to dominate global markets. Although there have been
some expressed concerns that these measures can also be used to
grow China’s military influence,55 concerns regarding China’s
economic policies have focused on distortive effects on the global
economy, unfair trading practices (such as subsidization and
industrial policies), and general concern regarding the overall
expansion of China’s government-led market practices. 56
50

Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,
CFR. (Jan. 28, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-beltand-road-initiative [https://perma.cc/BV6D-RSDL].
51
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV.,
https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html [https://perma.cc/6ZBSWGWY]; The Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance
landscape,
in
OECD
BUS.
AND
FIN.
OUTLOOK
2018
(2018),
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-tradeinvestment-and-finance-landscape.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JLM-NJ9W].
52
James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global
Trade, CFR. (May 13, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china2025-threat-global-trade [https://perma.cc/K8T2-T4TF].
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Joshua Andresen, China’s Military and the Belt and Road Initiative: A View from
the Outside, 5 THE CHINESE J. OF GLOB. GOVERNANCE 122, 123 (2019).
56
CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS,
CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (June 25, 2019),
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Against this backdrop, the U.S. government has often
minimized China’s role as a rising competitor and instead focused
on China as a rival, enemy, and national security threat. 57 This
position—while long-existing—became more prominent during the
Trump Administration, as rhetoric that accompanied such position
took on a tone of fear and existential threat. For example, in the
White House’s 2017 National Security Strategy, it described China
as “attempting to erode American security and prosperity,” a
“revisionist power” seeking to “shape a world antithetical to U.S.
values and interests,” and seeking to “displace the United States in
the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven
economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.” 58 Yet by
focusing solely on the purported values behind China’s policies, the
National Security Strategy and the Trump White House downplayed
the economic threat posed by China’s increased competitiveness in
the global and U.S. domestic markets vis-à-vis the United States.
By conflating the national security threat posed by China with
economic threat, the United States’ China-related policy during the
Trump Administration began using trade measures designed to
address national security concerns that were short-term, blunt, and
discriminatory (as measures arguably should address actual security
concerns in their immediacy). The United States thus ignored the
need to develop long-term, sophisticated measures that would hold
China accountable to its trade obligations, maintain the moral high
ground on the importance of the rule of law that the United States
had developed over the last seventy years participating in
international organizations, and effectively build up the
competitiveness of U.S. companies from within against Chinese and
other foreign counterparts.
Since then, the United States’ policies towards China have
not shown a remarkable change under the Biden Administration,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33534 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/HC4F-98JJ];
CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 1 (2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45249.pdf [https://perma.cc/43ZT-G244]
[hereinafter Section 232 Investigations].
57
Jeffrey Bader, Meeting the China Challenge: A Strategic Competitor, Not An
Enemy,
BROOKINGS
(2020)
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/Jeffrey-Bader.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6H4-XLCW].
58
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Dec. 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8PE-UDCR].
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unfortunately. The Biden Administration has maintained much of
the security-based trade measures enacted under the Trump
Administration59 (possibly left in place simply to provide leverage
in future trade negotiations), while at the same time enacting new
measures under the auspices of national security (often just in
response to domestic political claims that the Biden Administration
is “not as tough” on China as the Trump Administration).60 The
Biden Administration has thus maintained a confrontational
approach to relations with China, although with a more nuanced
acknowledgment that U.S. policy must account for China as a
strategic competitor and important participant in the global
economy.61
Again, to be clear, China continues to pose a variety of
challenges to the United States, including legitimate national
security and defense threats on which the United States should not
compromise. These include credible instances of cyber threats and
espionage; regional geographic unrest with respect to the South
China Sea, as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan; human rights and
forced labor concerns; as well as weapons of mass destruction
capabilities.62 Yet these are the types of threats that a national
security-based authority is meant to address. Taking an overly
broad approach and equating national security with economic
competitiveness concerns not only compromises the integrity of
national security-based measures, but also may result in economic
harm to the United States, stifling U.S. industries’ ability to build
true and long-lasting comparative advantages to gain a competitive
advantage over China’s growing industrial capabilities.

59

Asma Khad, Biden is keeping key parts of Trump’s China trade policy. Here’s why,
NPR (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/10/04/1043027789/biden-is-keeping-keyparts-of-trumps-china-trade-policy-heres-why [https://perma.cc/TQT8-ETTU].
60
Aime Williams, Biden official says protecting US steel a national security issue,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/e1f33362-2c36-4f99-9b117dcd82ee7c06 [https://perma.cc/4H4G-DBAF].
61
See supra note 59.
62
Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF
NAT’L INTEL. (2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021Unclassified-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7B5-TRM2].
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Recent National Security Measures Used to Address
Economic Concerns

In this section, we discuss the evolution of U.S. national
security measures, in particular those that have been used in recent
years to address perceived threats from China—including those that
are purely economic in nature.
1.

Section 232 Measures

Section 232 refers to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, as amended, which is codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
The purpose of a Section 232 investigation, which is conducted by
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s BIS, is to determine the effect
of imports on national security.
Upon completion of the
investigation, the Secretary of Commerce is to report BIS’s findings
to the President. Section 232 permits the President of the United
States to “adjust the imports” based on a recommendation by the
Secretary of Commerce if “an article is being imported into the
United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten or impair the national security.” 63 Although Section 232
requires the Secretary of Commerce to include recommendations on
actions or inactions with respect to the imports at issue, the final
decision on whether to take action, and what action to take, is left
solely to the President.
Although Section 232 itself does not explicitly define
“national security,” it is notable that the statute was passed in 1962,
at the height of the Cold War. One can imagine, therefore, that the
“national security” threat that Congress had in mind in enacting this
statute was to address the threat of over-reliance on foreign sources
for certain natural resources—which the United States may be
lacking—that could be suddenly cut off, or would be needed, in a
potential military conflict.
That the narrow reading of the statute was widely
understood is exemplified by the fact that the statute was used
sparsely between its enactment in 1962 and President Trump’s first
use of the statute against steel and aluminum imports in 2018.
Between 1962 and 2018, Section 232 was invoked only twenty-six
63

19 U.S.C. § 1862(c).
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times. Of these investigations, BIS made affirmative findings that
the imports in question threatened national security in nine
investigations.64 In the four years of the Trump Administration,
eight Section 232 investigations were initiated—accounting for
almost 24% of all Section 232 investigations in history.65 The 2017
investigations on steel and aluminum represented the first Section
232 investigations in sixteen years, and the 2018 tariffs resulting
from those investigations represented the first time that a President
took action under Section 232 since 1983—over ten years before the
establishment of the WTO.
Moreover, among the eight
investigations conducted under the Trump Administration, BIS
made positive determinations in six instances 66 and a negative
determination in only one instance. 67
64

Proclamation 4227—Modifying Proclamation No. 3279, Relating to Imports of
Petroleum and Petroleum Products, Providing for the Long-Term Control of Imports of
Petroleum and Petroleum Products Through a System of License Fees and Providing for
Gradual Reduction of Levels of Imports of Crude Oil, Unfinished Oils and Finished
Products,
THE
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(Jun.
19,
1973),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-4227-modifying-proclamationno-3279-relating-imports-petroleum-and-petroleum
[https://perma.cc/599K-797M];
Proclamation 4629—Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products, THE AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Dec. 8, 1978), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-4629imports-petroleum-and-petroleum-products [https://perma.cc/Y9Y2-3FK2]; Proclamation
4702—Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products From Iran, THE AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Nov. 12, 1979), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation4702-imports-petroleum-and-petroleum-products-from-iran
[https://perma.cc/U8C97WVG]; Proclamation 4907—Imports of Petroleum, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar.
10,
1982),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-4907-importspetroleum [https://perma.cc/P8YQ-S6M8]; Initiation of Investigation of Imports of MetalCutting and Metal-Forming Machine Tools, 48 Fed. Reg. 15174, 15175 (Apr. 7, 1983);
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF EXP. ADMIN., The Effect of Imports of Crude Oil
and Refined Petroleum Products on the National Security, at 6 (1994); U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., The Effect on the National Security of Imports of
Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products, 8 (1999).
65
Section 232 Investigations, supra note 56; Scott Lincicome & Inu Manak,
Protectionism or National Security? The Use and Abuse of Section 232, CATO INSTITUTE
(Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/protectionism-or-national-securityuse-abuse-section-232#background [https://perma.cc/DR43-VUF9]; Ana Swanson, Trump
to Impose Sweeping Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business/trump-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/BK6ETCGP] (“Our Steel and Aluminum industries (and many others) have been decimated by
decades of unfair trade and bad policy with countries from around the world. We must not
let our country, companies and workers be taken advantage of any longer.”).
66
See Steel Section 232 Report, supra note 6, at 5; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION,
THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 5 (2018) [hereinafter
“Aluminum Section 232 Report”); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY
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In addition to the number of investigations and positive
findings in comparison to prior administrations, the Section 232
actions under the Trump Administrations are also distinguished by
their broadened definition of national security.
Because Section 232 provides no definition for “national
security,” the statute does not facially restrict an interpretation that
is broader than originally intended. Nonetheless, it is notable that
the Section 232 reports under the Trump Administration depart from
traditional national security concerns. The first Section 232
investigations initiated by the Trump Administration addressed
imports of steel and aluminum.68 In particular, in the steel Section
232 investigation, BIS noted that “national security” under Section
232 is not limited to “national defense” but can be interpreted more
broadly to include the general security and welfare of certain
industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense
requirements.69 Although prior Section 232 reports also refer to
economic welfare, there have generally been clear national security
hooks in addition to ensuring that the economic conditions ensured
that the United States was not overly reliant on usually unfriendly
foreign sources for critical inputs. For example, Section 232 report
on glass-lined chemical processing equipment explicitly recognizes
that:
SECURITY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF
AUTOMOBILES AND AUTOMOBILE PARTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 11 (2018); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF URANIUM ON THE NATIONAL
SECURITY 15 (2019); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND
SECURITY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF TITANIUM
SPONGE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 18 (2019); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS OF TRANSFORMERS AND TRANSFORMER COMPONENTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY
17 (2020).
67
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF VANADIUM ON THE NATIONAL
SECURITY 10–11 (2020). One investigation on the effect of imports of mobile cranes was
terminated at the request of the petitioner.
68
Although the Trump Administration also initiated Section 232 investigations on
automobiles, uranium, titanium, transformers and grain-oriented electrical steel parts,
mobile cranes, and vanadium, we focus here primarily on the steel and aluminum Section
232 measures as the Trump Administration did not take any action with respect to the
remaining Section 232 investigations. CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE
EXPANSION
ACT
OF
1962
(2022),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10667.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BB37-UTM3].
69
See Steel Section 232 Report, supra note 6, at 13.
AND
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“[T]he purpose of a Section 232 investigation is to
safeguard the security of the nation, not the economic
welfare of a company or an industry, except as that
welfare may affect the national security.”70
In fact, prior Section 232 investigations often examined the
impact of the imports in relation to the United States’ defense
capabilities. For example, to examine the national security impact
of plastic injection molding machinery imports, the Bureau of
Export Administration (the predecessor of BIS) relied upon
industrial output requirements in the 1984 National Security
Council Stockpile Study, and in accordance with guidance provided
in that Study, utilized a scenario of a three-year war, preceded by a
one year mobilization effort.71 Similarly, the 1989 Section 232
report on imports of crude oil and petroleum was premised on the
allegation that “imports are weakening the domestic petroleum
industry to such an extent that it will not be able to support U.S.
security needs in the event of a global conventional war.”72
Although the 2018 reports on steel and aluminum examine the need
for steel and aluminum for national defense requirements, 73 they do
not cite to any specific defense needs or describe why such needs
must be met by domestic sources. Instead, the steel Section 232
report further emphasizes the economic and commercial nature of
the measure, explaining that:
“No company could afford to construct and operate
a modern steel mill solely to supply defense needs
because those needs are too diverse. In order to
supply those diverse national defense needs, U.S.
steel mills must attract sufficient commercial (i.e.,
non-defense) business.”74

70
Investigation of Imports of Glass-Lined Chemical Processing Equipment, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11746, 11747 (Mar. 18, 1982).
71
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF PLASTIC INJECTION MOLDING
MACHINES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 1–2 (1989).
72
Id.
73
See Steel Section 232 Report, supra note 6, at 23–24; see also Aluminum Section
232 Report, supra note 66, at 23–39.
74
See Steel Section 232 Report, supra note 6, at 23.
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While the aluminum Section 232 report refers to the need for
secure aluminum supplies in the event of a war, it does not conduct
a wartime scenario as in the plastic injection molding machinery
investigation, but rather surmises that:
“There is no assurance that some non-U.S. suppliers
such as Russia (the largest supplier of primary
aluminum to the U.S. after Canada) will provide all
the necessary aluminum products on a timely basis
and in the quantities requested, particularly in a time
of war or national emergency.”75
The departure from prior Section 232 investigations is
further evident in that the investigation and resulting measures do
not explicitly address the national security threat imposed by the
imports. For example, the steel and aluminum Section 232 reports
recognize that, although the steel and aluminum imports were
purportedly causing the national security threat, the U.S. military
only utilizes 3% of the total U.S. steel production,76 and a “small
percentage” of U.S. aluminum production. 77 Moreover, the United
States’ steel imports originate predominantly from reliable military
allies. The circumstances are thus starkly different from prior
Section 232 investigations. For example, the investigation on crude
oil from Libya in which the U.S. government determined that it
could no longer consider Libya to be a reliable supplier of U.S.
energy needs in the midst of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor
of terrorism78 and the Gulf of Sidra Incident. 79 Despite these facts,
unlike prior Section 232 determinations, the Trump Administration
applied substantial tariffs globally on essentially all primary steel
and aluminum products from around the world, rather than on
targeted countries that actually posed threats to the United States.
This was a departure from past Section 232 actions, which usually
took the form of quotas, license fees, and embargoes on a narrow
75

See Aluminum Section 232 Report, supra note 66, at 35.
See Steel Section 232 Report, supra note 6, at 23.
77
See Aluminum Section 232 Report, supra note 66, at 24.
78
Presidential Proclamation 4907 on Imports of Petroleum, 47 Fed. Reg. 10507 (Mar.
10, 1982).
79
Id. In August 1981, two Libyan jets fired on U.S. aircraft and the U.S. jets returned
fire and shot down the Libyan jets. Later that same year, the United States invalidated U.S.
passports for travel to Libya and advised all U.S. citizens in Libya to leave.
76
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range of products that were explicitly defined to form the target of
the threat.
That the Section 232 measures stem from concerns that are
far from national security concerns in the traditional sense is also
exemplified in how the Trump Administration utilized the import
measures. For example, Canada and Mexico’s exemptions from the
tariffs were made contingent on the conclusion of the renegotiation
of a new North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).80
Similarly, the Section 232 measures were used to secure certain
concessions from the Korean government during the Korea‑U.S.
trade agreement renegotiation talks that had begun months earlier. 81
Despite
early
criticisms
regarding
the
Trump
Administration’s Section 232 tariffs, President Biden has continued
the imposition of Section 232 tariffs and has indicated intent to
maintain the measures in place.
In fact, shortly after his
inauguration, President Biden re-imposed Section 232 tariffs on
imports of aluminum from the United Arab Emirates, which the
Trump Administration had removed. 82 Biden Administration
officials have also made public statements that suggest Section 232
tariffs have been effective at bolstering the United States’
competitive position, which again is misaligned with the purpose of
the measure.83
80
David Lawder, Trump’s Steel, Aluminum Tariffs Exempt Canada, Mexico,
REUTERS
(March. 8, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-tariffsidUKL2N1QQ23U [https://perma.cc/WMQ6-JJYM].
81
Simon Lester, Inu Manak, and Kyounghwa Kim, Trump’s First Trade Deal: The
Slightly Revised Kore-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, CATO INST. (June. 13, 2019),
https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/trumps-first-trade-deal-slightly-revised-korea-usfree-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/CF5E-Y3VC].
82
Proclamation No. 10144, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,265 (Feb. 4, 2021).
83
Secretary Raimondo has said that the Section 232 tariffs have helped revitalize
domestic steel and aluminum production. As a result, the Biden-Harris Administration does
not have plans to remove the steel and aluminum tariffs as part of negotiations with the EU
and UK because “simply saying no tariffs is not the solution” “if China is not going to play
by the rules.”; in an April 2021 press briefing, Secretary Raimondo said: “What we do on
offense is more important than what we do on defense. To compete in the long run with
China, we need to rebuild America in all of the ways we’re talking about today” and stated
that tariffs may be a tool to “level the playing field,” but also noted “the 232 tariffs on steel
and aluminum have, in fact, helped save American jobs in the steel and aluminum
industries.” Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Secretary of Commerce Gina
Raimondo,
April
7,
2021,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(Apr.
7,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/04/07/press-briefing-bypress-secretary-jen-psaki-and-secretary-of-commerce-gina-raimondo-april-7-2021/
[https://perma.cc/8G8F-L68M].
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Moreover, the Biden Administration has now initiated a new
Section 232 investigation of its own to determine the effects on the
national security from imports of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB)
permanent magnets.84 According to the Federal Register notice
requesting public comments, BIS explained that “[n]umerous
critical national security systems rely on NdFeB permanent
magnets, including fighter aircraft and missile guidance systems. 85
In addition, NdFeB permanent magnets are essential components of
critical infrastructure, including electric vehicles and wind
turbines.”86 As of the time of this writing, BIS has not issued a
determination on whether NdFeB permanent magnet imports pose a
threat to the national security, and/or what types of
recommendations BIS will issue if it does find that imports pose a
threat. While the Section 232 report might shed light on whether
the Biden Administration is signaling a shift back towards a more
traditional definition of national security, hopes are not high given
the Administration’s recent efforts to also use this tool for
seemingly competitive reasons (i.e., prior to the election, they were
critical of its overuse, but as noted have since changed their tune
now that they are in power).
2.

Export Controls

Like many countries around the world, the United States
maintains export controls to advance national security and foreign
policy objectives.
Export controls generally regulate the
international movement of commodities, software, and technology,
as well as certain services, for national security and foreign policy
purposes. In addition to maintaining unilateral export controls, the
United States also participates in multilateral export control
regimes,87 some of which are established by groups of nations in
84

Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security
Investigation of Imports of Neodymium-Iron-Boron (NdFeB) Permanent Magnets, 86 Fed.
Reg. 53,277 (Sept. 27, 2021).
85
Id. at 53,278.
86
Id. at 53,278.
87
The United States participates in four multilateral export control regimes:
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies, which is focused on promoting transparency and responsibility in
transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime, which focus
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furtherance of security-related obligations in binding United Nations
treaties and resolutions.88
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) is the
statutory authority underlying the U.S. export control regime. 89
Although the ECRA does not include a definition of “national
security,” it distinguishes between “national security” and “foreign
policy” interests, which it further distinguishes from economic
considerations. The ECRA statement of policy provides that it is
the policy of the United States to only use export controls to the
extent necessary, first, “to restrict the export of items which would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental
to the national security of the United States” and, second, “to restrict
the export of items if necessary to further significantly the foreign
policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international
obligations.”90 The first is explicitly focused on the narrow,
defense-oriented conception of national security, and the second is
explicitly and separately focused on foreign policy.
The statement of policy further sets forth seven enumerated
reasons for promulgating export controls.91 Six of these reasons
focus on traditional military and defense security-related interests:
on limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction, respectively. See Multilateral Export Control
Regimes, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policyguidance/multilateral-export-control-regimes [https://perma.cc/95VL-SZYV].
88
For example, although there is “no formal linkage” between the Missile
Technology Control Regime (“MTCR”) and the United Nations, “the activities of the
MTCR are consistent with the UN’s non-proliferation and export control efforts. For
example, applying the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis helps countries to
meet their export control obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.”
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME,
https://mtcr.info/frequently-asked-questions-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/S59X-KP2V]; see also
S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (deciding, among other things, “all States shall refrain from
providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire,
manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
and their means of delivery”). The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines are also “are
consistent with, and complement, the various international, legally binding instruments in
the field of nuclear non-proliferation,” including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG], About the NSG, nsgonline.org/en/about-nsg; see also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
89
Export Control Reform Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852 (2018).
90
Id. § 4811(1).
91
Id. § 4811(2).
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(1) controlling the release of items to prevent use in “the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or of conventional
weapons,” “the acquisition of destabilizing numbers or types of
conventional weapons,” “acts of terrorism,” “military programs that
could pose a threat to the security of the United States or its allies,”
or “activities undertaken specifically to cause significant
interference with or disruption of critical infrastructure”; (2)
“preserv[ing] the qualitative military superiority of the United
States”; (3) “strengthen[ing] the United States defense industrial
base”; (4) “carry[ing] out obligations and commitments under
international agreements and arrangements, including multilateral
export control regimes”;92 (5) “facilitate[ing] military
interoperability between the United States and its North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and other close allies”; and (6)
“ensure[ing] national security controls are tailored to focus on those
core technologies and other items that are capable of being used to
pose a serious national security threat to the United States.”93 The
seventh reason for imposing export controls is to “carry out the
foreign policy of the United States, including the protection of
human rights and the promotion of democracy.” 94 Thus, although
the ECRA authorizes the use of export controls for both national
security and foreign policy reasons, the authority to promulgate
export controls for foreign policy reasons is separately enumerated
and distinguished from the other traditional national security (i.e.,
defense-related) reasons.
The ECRA statement of policy draws a further distinction
between national security and foreign policy considerations on one
hand and economic considerations on the other, stating that it is the
policy of the United States “[t]o use export controls only after full
consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States.” 95
This mandate makes clear that it is not the purpose of export
controls to promote or enact economic policy. Rather, it explicitly
acknowledges that the interests that may properly underlie the
promulgation of export controls—national security and foreign

92

These multilateral export control regimes focus on traditional military and defenserelated national security concerns. See supra notes 88, 89.
93
50 U.S.C. § 4811(2)(A)–(C), (E)–(G).
94
Id. § 4811(2)(D).
95
Id. § 4811(1) (emphasis added).
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policy—intersect with, and may potentially conflict with and
undermine, U.S. economic interests.
Indeed, there are many areas in which U.S. economic
interests and national security interests inevitably overlap and are
inextricably intertwined. For example, the Biden Administration’s
economic agenda features plans to invest in research and
development and high-innovation, with the purpose of enhancing
U.S. leadership in critical technologies and fields such as
semiconductors,
advanced
computing,
and
advanced
96
communications technology.
In addition to having meaningful
implications for the U.S. economy, these technologies are associated
with legitimate national security concerns.
For example,
semiconductors play an essential role in modern-day military
equipment and critical infrastructure, such as telecommunications.97
Citing these national security concerns, in 2019 and 2020, the
Trump Administration imposed a series of unilateral export control
measures restricting exports of U.S. semiconductors and
semiconductor technology, with a particular focus on cutting off the
supply chain of the Chinese multinational telecommunications
giant,
Huawei
Technologies
Co.,
Ltd
(“Huawei”).98
Semiconductors, like many other high-technologies, sit at the
intersection of economic interests and national security concerns,
and can therefore feature legitimately in both the U.S. economic
agenda and U.S. defense and national security strategy. The ECRA
acknowledges this reality and explicitly requires export control
regulators to evaluate and weigh these distinct and competing
96
FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-theamerican-jobs-plan/ [https://perma.cc/Q9VM-A46A].
97
Akinori Kahata, Semiconductors as Natural Resources–Exploring the National
Security Dimensions of U.S.-China Technology Competition, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.csis.org/blogs/technology-policy-blog/semiconductorsnatural-resources-%E2%80%93-exploring-national-security
[https://perma.cc/44BXRP4G].
98
See, e.g., Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,961 (May 21,
2019); Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List and Revision of Entries on the Entity
List, 84 FR 43,493 (Aug. 21, 2019); Addition of Huawei Non-U.S. Affiliates to the Entity
List, the Removal of Temporary General License, and Amendments to General Prohibition
Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule), 85 FR 51,596 (Aug. 20, 2020); see also
Chad P. Bown, How the United States marched the semiconductor industry into its trade
war with China, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECONOMICS (Dec. 2020),
piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp20-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EKK-FFC6].
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interests in implementing export controls, but making clear that the
primacy of its analysis is with respect to defense and national
security.
Thus, in the context of trade relations with China in
particular, U.S. regulators must proceed carefully, deliberately, and
transparently in defining China-specific export control policy—
using export control tools within their statutory bounds but
acknowledging their limitations, and not seeking to use export
controls for trade policy or competitiveness issues for which they
are not appropriately tailored.99 The ECRA’s statutory guardrails
support this cause by articulating the relevant application and scope
of “national security” and “foreign policy,” including providing
specific examples of each.
The ECRA also mandates the
consideration of collateral economic consequences but addresses
these corollary impacts separate and apart from the national security
and foreign policy grounds in which the U.S. export control regime
may be rooted. This written framework helps ensure that export
controls are calibrated primarily to addressing the specific national
security and foreign policy objective at issue, while secondarily
avoiding unnecessary and unintended negative impacts on the U.S.
economy and competitive position. The ECRA’s statutory and
policy directives thereby serve to appropriately constrain and guide
the use of export control measures as a national security and foreign
policy tool, and not as an economic tool.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLATING NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS WITH ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS CONCERNS
Applying an excessively broad definition to “national
security” unfortunately masks legitimate economic and industrial
developments achieved by foreign countries such as China. As
99

Confronting Threats from China: Assessing Controls on Technology and
Investment: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 116th
Cong. (2019) (statement of Kevin Wolf, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP)
(“Export controls should be used to their fullest possible extent, however, when a specific
national security or foreign policy issue pertains to the export, reexport, or transfer of
commodities, technologies, software, or services to destinations, end users, or end uses. If
the issue pertains to an activity, an investment, or a concern separate from such events or
concerns, then one must look to other areas of law, such as sanctions, trade remedies,
foreign direct investment controls, intellectual property theft remedies, or counterespionage laws.”).
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indicated above, China’s industrial policies and practices do
sometimes pose legitimate threats to the United States’ national
security interests. However, to take the view that everything that
China does is of national security concern ignores how best to
address some of the key concerns that are in fact economic and
competitiveness based.
The Section 232 tariffs on steel, as noted previously, is a
prime example. For years, the global steel and aluminum industry
has suffered from overcapacity. The Section 232 reports on steel
and aluminum recognize as much, finding that “foreign competition
is characterized by substantial and sustained global overcapacity
and production in excess of foreign domestic demand.” 100 Neither
the recommended actions nor the actions taken by the President,
however, addressed the issue of global overcapacity; there were
limited efforts to seriously engage with countries allegedly engaged
in over-production or with allies to reform the global supply
chain.101 Rather, by framing the problem as a national security
issue, the Section 232 measure used a very blunt, short-term
instrument that simply made it more expensive for U.S. domestic
consumers to purchase both domestic and imported steel. Studies
show that most of the Section 232 tariffs were passed through into
domestic prices, leaving export prices unchanged.102 Therefore,
rather than addressing overcapacity, the Section 232 measures
ended up costing U.S. downstream jobs and loss of export
market.103
Moreover, the Section 232 measures did not result in a
revival or increase the competitiveness of the U.S. steel industry.
U.S. Steel, the largest steel company in the United States, recorded
losses of $642 million in 2019, and from November 2019 to
100
The Effects of Imports of Steel on the National Security, 85 Fed. Reg. 40210 (July
6, 2020) (notice).
101
, Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Excess Steel Capacity, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Sept. 20, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2018/september/ustr-statement-meeting-global
[https://perma.cc/W62F-EMLC].
102
Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding & David E. Weinstein, The Impact of the 2018
Tariffs on Prices and Welfare, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 197 (2019).
103
Scott Lincicome & Inu Manak, Protectionism or National Security? The Use and
Abuse of Section 232, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/protectionism-ornational-security-use-abuse-section-232#assessing-economic-impact-protecting-nationalsecurity [https://perma.cc/3EGG-59A8].
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February 2020 laid off more than 1,650 workers as it scaled back
production and idled facilities in Michigan and Indiana. 104 U.S.
company JSW Steel brought a lawsuit against BIS’s denial of its
product exclusion request, arguing that without an exemption from
Section 232 duties, its plants were operating at unprofitable
levels.105
Simply put, the national security measure did not resolve the
core issue because there was not a national security problem to
resolve. In order to address the global supply issues, it was
necessary for the United States to engage with all steel producing
countries, including China—the main source of overcapacity.
However, by nature, national security measure do not typically seek
engagement with the source of the “national security threat.” This
is reflected in the language of Section 232, which authorizes the
President to take defensive actions to prohibit the decrease or
elimination of duties when such reduction or elimination would
threaten to impair the national security; and to “adjust the imports of
the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten
to impair the national security.” Moreover, national security
measures are by nature temporal, intended to be in place only for the
time that such security concerns exist, and to be lifted when the
concern subsides. In such emergency situations, a blunt instrument
is usually needed, and sufficient. Competitiveness issues on the
other hand are long-term issues. They require a bit more nuance
and sophistication to ensure a long-term solution. Thus, in
hindsight, it is clear that the steel and aluminum issues are economic
competitiveness issues that require a long-term, sophisticated
solution; and not a short term, blunt instrument such as broad
punitive import tariffs.
With respect to export controls, as noted above, the ECRA
provides meaningful guardrails regarding what is considered to fall
within the scope of “national security,” as distinct from other
104
Joseph S. Pete, U.S. Steel lays off more workers in third round of cuts, TIMES NW.
IND. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.nwitimes.com/business/steel/u-s-steel-lays-off-moreworkers-in-third-round-of-cuts/article_74fd78e7-afa9-512a-823f-ea75160a7c7b.html. Steel
did not publish the amount of people laid off in February 2020, thus the figure of 1,650 is
based on a sum of the November and December 2019 layoffs.
105
Bryan Gruley & Joe Deaux, The Biggest Fan of Trump’s Steel Tariffs is Suing Over
Them, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020steel-tariffs-jsw/ [https://perma.cc/98WF-Q2QN].
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foreign policy issues and economic considerations. If the United
States strays from the traditional, defense-focused notion of national
security as it is articulated in the ECRA and deploys export controls
for economic ends, it risks delegitimizing its export control regime
and the important national security purpose it serves.
If export control measures are not narrowly tailored to the
relevant national security concern, they may also give rise to
unintended consequences that undermine U.S. national security
interests and unintentionally harm the U.S. competitive position.
Taking the semiconductor industry as an example, the U.S.-China
trade war—including the 2019 and 2020 changes to U.S. export
controls aimed at restricting exports of U.S. semiconductors and
related technology to Huawei—has been cited as a contributor to
declining revenue in the U.S. semiconductor industry. 106 Notably,
top U.S. semiconductor companies reported a median revenue
decline of between 4% and 9% in each of the three quarters after the
May 2019 export control measures restricting exports to Huawei
were imposed.107 Semiconductor industry associations and analysts
have highlighted the disruptive consequences of broad restrictions
on sales of non-sensitive, commercial semiconductor products to
targeted Chinese companies, noting that access to growth markets
such as China drive U.S. semiconductor research and development
for advanced semiconductors that are critical to meeting U.S.
defense needs.108 Analysts have forecasted that the maintenance of
106
ANTONIO VARAS & RAJ VARADARAJAN, BOS. CONSULTING GRP., HOW
RESTRICTIONS TO TRADE WITH CHINA COULD END US LEADERSHIP IN SEMICONDUCTORS 4
(Mar. 2020), https://web-assets.bcg.com/img-src/BCG-How-Restricting-Trade-with-ChinaCould-End-US-Semiconductor-Mar-2020_tcm9-240526.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AH3JTQ8B].
107
Id.
108
See, e.g., SIA Statement on Export Control Rule Changes, SEMICONDUCTOR INDUS.
ASS’N (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.semiconductors.org/sia-statement-on-export-controlrule-changes-2/ [https://perma.cc/E34E-GKGV] (citing concerns regarding the August
2020 export control rule changes targeting Huawei, the SIA reiterated its “view that sales
of non-sensitive, commercial products to China drive semiconductor research and
innovation here in the U.S., which is critical to America’s economic strength and national
security”); Comments from SEMI on the Interim-Final Rule Amending General
Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List, S EMI (July
14,
2020),
https://www.semi.org/sites/semi.org/files/202007/July_14_SEMI_FDPR_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9EH-KBLD] (highlighting
reports from SEMI members of sales losses to “companies in the semiconductor supply
chain seeking to avoid the uncertainty the regulation creates for U.S.-origin items”);
VARAS & VARADARAJAN, supra note 106, at 24 (“[A] dramatically scaled-down US
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broad, unilateral restrictions on Huawei and other targeted Chinese
companies would result in continued declines in the global share
and revenue of U.S. semiconductor companies, with resulting
negative impacts to U.S. national security interests. 109
Beyond negative impacts on U.S. industry, overly broad
applications of trade measures designed to target national security
issues undermines U.S. credibility and rapport with other trading
partners. The expansive interpretations of “national security” in the
Section 232 context elicited retaliatory tariffs on steel and aluminum
not only from China but also from key U.S. trading partners
including Canada, the European Union, Mexico, and the United
Kingdom.110 In the export control context, the ECRA’s statement of
policy explicitly provides that, “[e]xport controls should be
coordinated with the multilateral export control regimes,” and
“[e]xport controls that are multilateral are most effective.” 111
Indeed, this reflects the prevailing view of governments and experts
given not only the risk of negative impacts to U.S. industry but also
the threats that unilateral action may pose to the sovereignty of
semiconductor industry that no longer functioned as a global leader would not be able to
fund the level of R&D investment required to fulfill needs for advanced semiconductors
for critical defense and national security capabilities”); SIA Statement on Export Control
Rule Changes, SEMICONDUCTOR INDUS. ASS’N (Aug. Comments of the Semiconductor
Industry Association (SIA) on Amendments to General Prohibition Three (ForeignProduced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List (July 14, 2020),
https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/SIA-Comments-on-ForeignDirect-Product-July-14-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8CG-DYD6] ) (“Over 80 percent of
revenue for U.S. semiconductor companies come from sales to foreign markets, making
access to global markets critical to our industry’s success.”).
109
VARAS & VARADARAJAN, supra note 106, at 1 (forecasting that “[o]ver the next
three to five years, US companies could lose 8% points of global share and 16% of their
revenues, if the US maintains the restrictions enacted with the current Entity List,” which
includes broad restrictions on Huawei).
110
Foreign Retaliations Timeline, Int’l Trade Admin., https://www.trade.gov/featurearticle/foreign-retaliations-timeline [https://perma.cc/FV4E-ZZH6]; Steel and Aluminum,
Gov’t
of
Canada,
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/controlscontroles/steel_alum-acier_alum.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/DVH3-RTUD]; Sabrina
Rodriguez, Mexico imposes retaliatory tariffs on dozens of U.S. goods , Politico (July 5,
2018, 11:38 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/05/mexico-imposes-retaliatorytariffs-670424 [https://perma.cc/JMY2-BA2L]; The United States has since reached
agreements with Canada and Mexico to remove the Section 232 tariffs for steel and
aluminum. United States Announces Deal with Canada and Mexico to Lift Retaliatory
Tariffs, Off. Of the U.S. Trade Representatives (May 17, 2019), https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/united-states-announces-dealcanada-and [https://perma.cc/RVL5-UYHR].Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
111
50 U.S.C. § 4811(5).
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allied nations.112 Accordingly, applying an excessively broad
definition of “national security” carries not only negative internal
impacts for U.S. industry but also negative external implications
affecting trade relations between the United States and its allies.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The labelling of a large number of trade-related issues
concerning China as national security concerns may often be
desirable and advantageous to the U.S. Administration and other
U.S. policymakers from a political perspective. As discussed above,
this allows the United States to utilize national security tools, which
have fewer legal constraints in executive power. Moreover, labeling
all actions by China as national security threats is an easy way to
garner public support through playing the nationalism card.
In reality, using such instruments haphazardly, without the
proper legal and factual basis, has resulted in costs that outweigh the
benefits. Indeed, as discussed above, the adverse effects of such
blunt, sudden instruments have resulted in unintended adverse
effects on U.S. companies, U.S. jobs, and the U.S. economy overall.
Therefore, rather than taking the overly simplistic approach that outcompeting China and addressing national security threats posed by
China are synonymous, the U.S. government should clearly
articulate and critically examine the nature of the underlying policy
issue. What is truly the “national security” issue in a particular
context? What is the nature of the national security threat, if any?
112
CONG. RSCH. SERV., EXP. CONTROLS: KEY CHALLENGES (2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11154
[https://perma.cc/YWS2-XA83]
(“Most observers would concur that multilateral controls are more effective than unilateral
controls in preventing the unwanted dissemination of strategic goods and technology.”);
NAT’L ACAD. SCI., FINDING COMMON GROUND: U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS IN A CHANGED
GLOBAL ENV’T, at 19–20 (1991) (“Unilateralism disadvantages the U.S. economy and can
rarely be justified in a competitive world economy by security concerns. Unilateral features
should be eliminated from U.S. national security export controls except in those rare
instances in which such a unilateral action would be effective or holds the prospect of
changing the position of other countries within a relatively short time.”); Chad P. Bown,
How Trump’s export curbs on semiconductors and equipment hurt the US technology
sector, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Sept. 28, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/how-trumps-export-curbssemiconductors-and-equipment-hurt-us [https://perma.cc/J8LB-2HNZ] (“By restricting
what foreign companies can do in their home countries, the administration is threatening
allied governments’ national sovereignty, setting a dangerous precedent of unilateralism.”).
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And is the national security measure being contemplated
appropriately tailored to addressing the very concern at issue?
In sum, “national security” should not become a way to
avoid such critical analysis. It provides important tools that should
be wielded carefully so as to avoid overreach, and to ensure
credibility when the tools are actually needed. There is critical
value with respect to this last point. Not only does careful use of
national security instruments by the United States model the
primacy of the rule of law in the global context, it discourages other
countries from claiming national or defensive security when there is
no such concern, and it helps the United States to maintain the
moral high ground in its role as a leader of the world trading
community.
Domestically, enacting trade policy and employing trade
measures, and clearly distinguishing such actions from more clearly
defined terms “national security,” will only create greater
predictability, stability, and transparency for the U.S. economy,
whereby all will benefit. With respect to how the United States deal
with China, clearly delineating between economic competitive
concerns and legitimate national security concerns will mitigate
adverse consequences associated with conflating the two problems
and will not allow the two countries to compartmentalize these
issues such that problems can be isolated and dealt with in the
appropriate time without fully decoupling the bilateral relationship.
Indeed, the Biden Administration has recently signaled that it
recognizes the importance of engaging with China as a competitor
and peer, as well as the negative consequences of failing to do so. 113
With respect to how best to deal with the economic
competitiveness issues, it is our view that the best defense is a good
113

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR. & WHITE HOUSE, INTERIM NAT’L SEC. GUIDANCE 21 (Mar.
2021) (stating that it may be in the U.S. interests to work with China “on issues such as
climate change, global health security, arms control and nonproliferation”); Anthony J.
Blinken, Secretary of State, Department of State, Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s
Alliances (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.state.gov/reaffirming-and-reimagining-americasalliances/?utm_campaign=Marketing_Cloud&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Washingt
on+Update+3.25.2021&%20utm_content=https%3a%2f%2fwww.state.gov%2freaffirming
-and-reimagining-americas-alliances%2f [https://perma.cc/L3NB-QAJP] (stating to NATO
that “[t]he United States won’t force allies to choose our allies into a ‘us or them’ choice
with China” and that “[t]here’s no question that Beijing’s coercive behavior threatens our
collective security and prosperity . . . [b]ut that doesn’t mean that countries can’t work with
China where possible, for example, on challenges like climate change and health
security.”).
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offense. In other words, the United States must practice what it
preaches by competing on a level playing field based on market
forces, rather than seek to artificially “contain” or suppress China’s
rise.114 And rather than approaching U.S.-China relations from the
sole standpoint of a broad, imprecise concept of “national security,”
resulting only in the adoption of defensive trade measures intended
originally only to diffuse such threats, the United States must
acknowledge the complexity of the bilateral relationship, recognize
that China is a legitimate economic competitor that needs to be kept
accountable, and then utilize legitimate tools to ensure a level
playing field and a strong market competitiveness environment to
benefit U.S. companies, U.S. consumers, and U.S. interests in the
long term.115

114

MICHAEL BROWN, ERIC CHEWNING & PAVNEET SINGH, GLOBAL CHINA, PREPARING
UNITED STATES FOR THE SUPERPOWER MARATHON WITH CHINA (Apr. 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_superpower_marathon_brown_chewning_singh.pd
f [https://perma.cc/YK6C-2LE2].
115
Bader, supra note 57, at 1 (“While strategic competition with China will be the
overall framework for the immediate future, it would be contrary to American interests to
treat China as an enemy.”); World Trade Online, HASC Chairman: U.S. must accept
competition with China, not aim for dominance, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2021,
10:57 AM) https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/hasc-chairman-us-must-accept-competitionchina-not-aim-dominance (quoting House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam
Smith stating that “[t]here’s going to be peer competitors and we’re going to spend
ourselves into the ground if we try to imagine that China can’t ever become a peer with
us”).
THE
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